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Abstract
Multiple different approaches of generating ad-
versarial examples have been proposed to attack
deep neural networks. These approaches involve
either directly computing gradients with respect
to the image pixels, or directly solving an op-
timization on the image pixels. In this work,
we present a fundamentally new method for gen-
erating adversarial examples that is fast to exe-
cute and provides exceptional diversity of out-
put. We efficiently train feed-forward neural net-
works in a self-supervised manner to generate
adversarial examples against a target network or
set of networks. We call such a network an Ad-
versarial Transformation Network (ATN). ATNs
are trained to generate adversarial examples that
minimally modify the classifier’s outputs given
the original input, while constraining the new
classification to match an adversarial target class.
We present methods to train ATNs and analyze
their effectiveness targeting a variety of MNIST
classifiers as well as the latest state-of-the-art Im-
ageNet classifier Inception ResNet v2.
1. Introduction and Background
With the resurgence of deep neural networks for many real-
world classification tasks, there is an increased interest in
methods to generate training data, as well as to find weak-
nesses in trained models. An effective strategy to achieve
both goals is to create adversarial examples that trained
models will misclassify. Adversarial examples are small
perturbations of the inputs that are carefully crafted to fool
the network into producing incorrect outputs. These small
perturbations can be used both offensively, to fool models
into giving the “wrong” answer, and defensively, by pro-
viding training data at weak points in the model. Semi-
nal work by Szegedy et al. (2013) and Goodfellow et al.
(2014b), as well as much recent work, has shown that ad-
versarial examples are abundant, and that there are many
ways to discover them.
Given a classifier f(x) : x ∈ X → y ∈ Y and orig-
inal inputs x ∈ X , the problem of generating untar-
geted adversarial examples can be expressed as the opti-
mization: argminx∗ L(x,x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) 6= f(x), where
L(·) is a distance metric between examples from the in-
put space (e.g., the L2 norm). Similarly, generating a tar-
geted adversarial attack on a classifier can be expressed as
argminx∗ L(x,x
∗) s.t. f(x∗) = yt, where yt ∈ Y is some
target label chosen by the attacker.1
Until now, these optimization problems have been solved
using three broad approaches: (1) By directly using opti-
mizers like L-BFGS or Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015), as
proposed in Szegedy et al. (2013) and Carlini & Wag-
ner (2016). Such optimizer-based approaches tend to be
much slower and more powerful than the other approaches.
(2) By approximation with single-step gradient-based tech-
niques like fast gradient sign (Goodfellow et al., 2014b)
or fast least likely class (Kurakin et al., 2016a). These ap-
proaches are fast, requiring only a single forward and back-
ward pass through the target classifier to compute the per-
turbation. (3) By approximation with iterative variants of
gradient-based techniques (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016a;b). These approaches use multiple
forward and backward passes through the target network to
more carefully move an input towards an adversarial clas-
sification.
1Another axis to compare when considering adversarial at-
tacks is whether the adversary has access to the internals of the tar-
get model. Attacks without internal access are possible by trans-
ferring successful attacks on one model to another model, as in
Szegedy et al. (2013); Papernot et al. (2016a), and others. A more
challenging class of blackbox attacks involves having no access
to any relevant model, and only getting online access to the tar-
get model’s output, as explored in Papernot et al. (2016b); Baluja
et al. (2015); Trame`r et al. (2016). See Papernot et al. (2015) for
a detailed discussion of threat models.
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Adversarial Transformation Networks
2. Adversarial Transformation Networks
In this work, we propose Adversarial Transformation Net-
works (ATNs). An ATN is a neural network that transforms
an input into an adversarial example against a target net-
work or set of networks. ATNs may be untargeted or tar-
geted, and trained in a black-box2 or white-box manner. In
this work, we will focus on targeted, white-box ATNs.
Formally, an ATN can be defined as a neural network:
gf,θ(x) : x ∈ X → x′ (1)
where θ is the parameter vector of g, f is the target network
which outputs a probability distribution across class labels,
and x′ ∼ x, but argmax f(x) 6= argmax f(x′).
Training. To find gf,θ, we solve the following optimiza-
tion:
argmin
θ
∑
xi∈X
βLX (gf,θ(xi),xi)+LY(f(gf,θ(xi)), f(xi))
(2)
where LX is a loss function in the input space (e.g., L2 loss
or a perceptual similarity loss like Johnson et al. (2016)),
LY is a specially-formed loss on the output space of f (de-
scribed below) to avoid learning the identity function, and
β is a weight to balance the two loss functions. We will
omit θ from gf when there is no ambiguity.
Inference. At inference time, gf can be run on any input
x without requiring further access to f or more gradient
computations. This means that after being trained, gf can
generate adversarial examples against the target network f
even faster than the single-step gradient-based approaches,
such as fast gradient sign, so long as ||gf || / ||f ||.
Loss Functions. The input-space loss function, LX ,
would ideally correspond closely to human perception.
However, for simplicity, L2 is sufficient. LY determines
whether or not the ATN is targeted; the target refers to the
class for which the adversary will cause the classifier to
output the maximum value. In this work, we focus on the
more challenging case of creating targeted ATNs, which
can be defined similarly to Equation 1:
gf,t(x) : x ∈ X → x′ (3)
where t is the target class, so that argmax f(x′) = t. This
allows us to target the exact class the classifier should mis-
takenly believe the input is.
In this work, we define LY,t(y′,y) = L2(y′, r(y, t)),
where y = f(x), y′ = f(gf (x)), and r(·) is a reranking
function that modifies y such that yk < yt,∀ k 6= t.
2E.g., using Williams (1992) to generate training gradients
for the ATN based on a reward signal computed on the result of
sending the generated adversarial examples to the target network.
Note that training labels for the target network are not re-
quired at any point in this process. All that is required is the
target network’s outputs y and y′. It is therefore possible to
train ATNs in a self-supervised manner, where they use un-
labeled data as the input and make argmax f(gf,t(x)) = t.
Reranking function. There are a variety of options for
the reranking function. The simplest is to set r(y, t) =
onehot(t), but other formulations can make better use of
the signal already present in y to encourage better recon-
structions. In this work, we look at reranking functions that
attempt to keep r(y, t) ∼ y. In particular, we use r(·) that
maintains the rank order of all but the targeted class in or-
der to minimize distortions when computing x′ = gf,t(x).
The specific r(·) used in our experiments has the following
form:
rα(y, t) = norm
{α ∗maxy if k = t
yk otherwise
}
k∈y

(4)
α > 1 is an additional parameter specifying how much
larger yt should be than the current max classification.
norm(·) is a normalization function that rescales its input
to be a valid probability distribution.
2.1. Adversarial Example Generation
There are two approaches to generating adversarial exam-
ples with an ATN. The ATN can be trained to generate just
the perturbation to x, or it can be trained to generate an
adversarial autoencoding of x.
• Perturbation ATN (P-ATN): To just generate a per-
turbation, it is sufficient to structure the ATN as a vari-
ation on the residual block (He et al., 2015): gf (x) =
tanh(x+G(x)), where G(·) represents the core func-
tion of gf . With small initial weight vectors, this struc-
ture makes it easy for the network to learn to generate
small, but effective, perturbations.
• Adversarial Autoencoding (AAE): AAE ATNs are
similar to standard autoencoders, in that they attempt
to accurately reconstruct the original input, subject to
regularization, such as weight decay or an added noise
signal. For AAE ATNs, the regularizer is LY . This
imposes an additional requirement on the AAE to add
some perturbation p to x such that r(f(x′)) = y′.
For both ATN approaches, in order to enforce that x′ is
a plausible member of X , the ATN should only generate
values in the valid input range of f . For images, it suffices
to set the activation function of the last layer to be the tanh
function; this constrains each output channel to [−1, 1].
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Table 1. Baseline Accuracy of Five MNIST Classifiers
Architecture Acc.
Classifier-Primary (Classifierp)
(5x5 Conv)→ (5x5 Conv)→ FC→ FC 98.6%
Classifier-Alternate-0 (Classifiera0)
(5x5 Conv)→ (5x5 Conv)→ FC→ FC 98.5%
Classifier-Alternate-1 (Classifiera1)
(4x4 Conv)→ (4x4 Conv)→ (4x4 Conv)→ FC→ FC 98.9%
Classifier-Alternate-2 (Classifiera2)
(3x3 Conv)→ (3x3 Conv)→ (3x3 Conv)→ FC→ FC 99.1%
Classifier-Alternate-3 (Classifiera3)
(3x3 Conv)→ FC→ FC→ FC 98.5%
2.2. Related Network Architectures
This training objective resembles standard Generative Ad-
versarial Network training (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) in
that the goal is to find weaknesses in the classifier. It is
interesting to note the similarity to work outside the adver-
sarial training paradigm — the recent use of feed-forward
neural networks for artistic style transfer in images (Gatys
et al., 2015)(Ulyanov et al., 2016). Gatys et al. (2015)
originally proposed a gradient descent procedure based on
“back-driving networks” (Linden & Kindermann, 1989) to
modify the inputs of a fully-trained network to find a set
of inputs that maximize a desired set of outputs and hid-
den unit activations. Unlike standard network training in
which the gradients are used to modify the weights of the
network, here, the network weights are frozen and the in-
put itself is changed. In subsequent work, Ulyanov et al.
(2016) created a method to approximate the results of the
gradient descent procedure through the use of an off-line
trained neural network. Ulyanov et al. (2016) removed the
need for a gradient descent procedure to operate on every
source image to which a new artistic style was to be ap-
plied, and replaced it with a single forward pass through a
separate network. Analagously, we do the same for gen-
erating adverarial examples: a separately trained network
approximates the usual gradient descent procedure done on
the target network to find adversarial examples.
3. MNIST Experiments
To begin our empirical exploration, we train five networks
on the standard MNIST digit classification task (LeCun
et al., 1998). The networks are trained and tested on the
same data; they vary only in the weight initialization and
architecture, as shown in Table 1. Each network has a mix
of convolution (Conv) and Fully Connected (FC) layers.
The input to the networks is a 28x28 grayscale image and
the output is 10 logit units. Classifierp and Classifiera0 use
the same architecture, and only differ in the initialization of
the weights. We will primarily use Classifierp for the ex-
periments in this section. The other networks will be used
Figure 1. (Left) A simple classification network which takes input
image x. (Right) With the same input, x, the ATN emits x′, which
is fed into the classification network. In the example shown, the
input digit is classified correctly as a 3 (on the left), ATN7 takes x
as input and generates a modified image (3′) such that the classi-
fier outputs a 7 as the highest activation and the previous highest
classification, 3, as the second highest activation (on the right).
later to analyze the generalization capabilities of the adver-
saries. Table 1 shows that all of the networks perform well
on the digit recognition task.3
We attempt to create an Adversarial Autoencoding ATN
that can target a specific class given any input image. The
ATN is trained against a particular classifier as illustrated
in Figure 1. The ATN takes the original input image, x, as
input, and outputs a new image, x′, that the target classifier
should erroneously classify as t. We also add the constraint
that the ATN should maintain the ordering of all the other
classes as initially output by the classifier. We train ten
ATNs against Classifierp – one for each target digit, t.
An example is provided to make this concrete. If a clas-
sifier is given an image, x3, of the digit 3, a successful
ordering of the outputs (from largest to smallest) may be
as follows: Classifierp(x3) → [3, 8, 5, 0, 4, 1, 9, 7, 6, 2]. If
ATN7 is applied to x3, when the resulting image, x′3, is fed
into the same classifier, the following ordering of outputs is
desired (note that the 7 has moved to the highest output):
Classifierp(ATN7(x3))→ [7, 3, 8, 5, 0, 4, 1, 9, 6, 2].
Training for a single ATNt proceeds as follows. The
weights of Classifierp are frozen and never change during
ATN training. Every training image, x, is passed through
Classifierp to obtain output y. As described in Equation 4,
we then compute rα(y, t) by copying y to a new value, y′,
3It is easy to get better performance than this on MNIST, but
for these experiments, it was more important to have a variety of
architectures that achieved similar accuracy, than to have state-of-
the-art performance.
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Table 2. Average success of ATN0−9 at transforming an image such that it is misclassified by Classifierp. As β is reduced, the ability
to fool Classifierp increases. How to read the table: Top row of cell: percentage of times Classifierp labeled x′ as t. Middle row of
cell: percentage of times Classifierp labeled x′ as t and kept the original classification (argmaxy) in second place. Bottom row of cell:
percentage of all x′ that kept the original classification in second place.
β:
0.010 0.005 0.001
ATNa
FC→ FC→28x28 Image
69.1%
91.7%
63.5%
84.1%
93.4%
78.6%
95.9%
95.3%
91.4%
ATNb
(3x3 Conv)→ (3x3 Conv)→
(3x3 Conv)→ FC→ 28x28 Image
61.8%
93.8%
58.7%
77.7%
95.8%
74.5%
89.2%
97.4%
86.9%
ATNc
(3x3 Conv)→ (3x3 Conv)→(3x3 Conv)
→ Deconv: 7x7→ Deconv: 14x14→ 28x28 Image
66.6%
95.5%
64.0%
82.5%
96.6%
79.7%
91.4%
97.5%
89.1%
setting y′t = α ∗max(y), and then renormalizing y′ to be a
valid probability distribution. This sets the target class, t, to
have the highest value in y′ while maintaining the relative
order of the other original classifications. In the MNIST
experiments, we empirically set α = 1.5.
Given y′, we can now train ATNt to generate x′ by mini-
mizing β ∗LX = β ∗L2(x,x′) and LY = L2(y,y′) using
Equation 2. Though the weights of Classifierp are frozen,
error derivatives are still passed through them to train the
ATN. We explore several values of β to balance the two
loss functions. The results are shown in Table 2.
Experiments. We tried three ATN architectures for the
AAE task, and each was trained with three values of β
against all ten targets, t. The full 3 × 3 set of experiments
are shown in Table 2. The accuracies shown are the ability
of ATNt to transform an input image x into x′ such that
Classifierp mistakenly classifies x′ as t.4 Each measure-
ment in Table 2 is the average of the 10 networks, ATN0−9.
Results. In Figure 2(top), each row represents the trans-
formation that ATNt makes to digits that were initially cor-
rectly classified as 0-9 (columns). For example, in the top
row, the digits 1-9 are now all classified as 0. In all cases,
their second highest classification is the original correct
classification (0-9).
The reconstructions shown in Figure 2(top) have the largest
β; smaller β values are shown in the bottom row. The fi-
delity to the underlying digit diminishes as β is reduced.
However, by loosening the constraints to stay similar to
the original input, the number of trials in which the trans-
4Images that were originally classified as t were not counted
in the test as no transformation on them was required.
Figure 2. Successful adversarial examples from ATNt against
Classifierp. Top is with the highest β = 0.010. Bottom two
are with β = 0.005 & 0.001, respectively. Note that as β is
decreased, the fidelity to the underlying digit decreases. The col-
umn in each block corresponds to the correct classification of the
image. The row corresponds to the adversarial classification, t.
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Figure 3. Typical transformations made to MNIST digits against Classifierp. Black digits on the white background are output classifica-
tions from Classifierp. The bottom classification is the original (correct) classification. The top classification is the result of classifying
the adversarial example. White digits on black backgrounds are the MNIST digits and their transformations to adversarial examples.
The bottom MNIST digits are unmodified, and the top are adversarial. In all of these images, the adversarial example is classified as
t = argmaxy′ while maintaining the second highest output in y′ as the original classification, argmaxy.
former network is able to successfully “fool” the classifi-
cation network increases dramatically, as seen in Table 2.
Interestingly, with β = 0.010, in Figure 2(second row),
where there should be a ‘0’ that is transformed into a ‘1’,
no digit appears. With this high β, no example was found
that could be transformed to successfully fool Classifierp.
With the two smaller β values, this anomaly does not occur.
In Figure 3, we provide a closer look at examples of x and
x′ for ATNc with β = 0.005. A few points should be noted:
• The transformations maintain the large, empty regions
of the image. Unlike many previous studies in attack-
ing classifiers, the addition of salt-and-pepper type
noise did not appear (Nguyen et al., 2014; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016b).
• In the majority of the generated examples, the shape
of the digit does not dramatically change. This is the
desired behavior: by training the networks to main-
tain the order beyond the top-output, only minimal
changes should be made to the image. The changes
that are often introduced are patches where the light
strokes have become darker.
• Vertical-linear components of the original images are
emphasized in several digits; it is especially notice-
able in the digits transformed to 1. With other digits
(e.g., 8), it is more difficult to find a consistent pattern
of what is being (de)emphasized to cause the classifi-
cation network to be fooled.
Table 3. Rank Difference in Secondary Outputs, Pre/Post Trans-
formation. Top-5 (Top-9).
β:
0.010 0.005 0.001
ATNa 0.93 (0.99) 0.98 (1.04) 1.04 (1.13)
ATNb 0.81 (0.87) 0.83 (0.89) 0.86 (0.93)
ATNc 0.79 (0.85) 0.83 (0.90) 0.89 (0.97)
A novel aspect of ATNs is that though they cause the tar-
get classifier to output an erroneous top-class, they are also
trained to ensure that the transformation preserves the ex-
isting output ordering of the target-classifier (other than the
top-class). For the examples that were successfully trans-
formed, Table 3 gives the average rank-difference of the
outputs with the pre-and-post transformed images (exclud-
ing the intentional targeted misclassification).
4. A Deeper Look into ATNs
This section explores three extensions to the basic ATNs:
increasing the number of networks the ATNs can attack,
using hidden state from the target network, and using ATNs
in serial and parallel.
4.1. Adversarial Transfer to Other Networks
So far, we have examined ATNs in the context of attack-
ing a single classifier. Can ATNs create adversarial exam-
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Table 4. ATNb with β = 0.005 trained to defeat Classifierp. Tested on 5 classifiers, without further training, to measure transfer. 1st
place is the percentage of times t was the top classification. 2nd place measures how many times the original top class (argmaxy) was
correctly placed into 2nd place, conditioned on the 1st place being correct (Conditional) or unconditioned on 1st place (Unconditional).
Classifierp* Classifiera0 Classifiera1 Classifiera2 Classifiera3
1st Place Correct 82.5% 15.7% 16.1% 7.7% 28.9%
2nd Place Correct (Conditional) 96.6% 84.7% 89.3% 85.0% 81.8%
2nd Place Correct (Unconditional) 79.7% 15.6% 16.1% 8.4% 26.2%
ples that generalize to other classifiers? Much research has
studied adversarial transfer for traditional adversaries, in-
cluding the recent work of Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016a);
Liu et al. (2016).
Targeting multiple networks. To test transfer, we take
the adversarial examples from the previously trained ATNs
and test them against Classifiera0,a1,a2,a3 (described in Ta-
ble 1).
The results in Table 4 clearly show that the transformations
made by the ATN are not general; they are tied to the net-
work it is trained to attack. Even Classifiera0, which has
the same architecture as Classifierp, is not more suscep-
tible to the attacks than those with different architectures.
Looking at the second place correctness scores (in the same
Table 4), it may, at first, seem counter-intuitive that the con-
ditional probability of a correct second-place classification
remains high despite a low first-place classification. The
reason for this is that in the few cases in which the ATN
was able to successfully change the classifier’s top choice,
the second choice (the real classification) remained a close
second (i.e., the image was not transformed in a large man-
ner), thereby maintaining the high performance in the con-
ditional second rank measurement.
Training against multiple networks. Is it possible to
create a network that will be able to create a single trans-
form that can attack multiple networks? Will such an ATN
generalize better to unseen networks? To test this, we cre-
ated an ATN that receives training signals from multiple
networks, as shown in Figure 4. As with the earlier train-
ing, the LX reconstruction error remains.
The new ATN was trained with classification signals from
three networks: Classifierp, and Classifiera1,2. The training
proceeds in exactly the same manner as described earlier,
except the ATN attempts to minimize LY for all three tar-
get networks at the same time. The results are shown in
Table 5. First, examine the columns corresponding to the
networks that were used in the training (marked with an *).
Note that the success rates of attacking these three clas-
sifiers are consistently high, comparable with those when
Figure 4. The ATN now has to fool three networks (of various ar-
chitectures), while also minimizing LX , the reconstruction error.
the ATN was trained with a single network. Therefore, it
is possible to learn a transformation network that modifies
images such that perturbation defeats multiple networks.
Next, we turn to the remaining two networks to which the
adversary was not given access during training. There is
a large increase in success rates over those when the ATN
was trained with a single target network (Table 4). How-
ever, the results do not match those of the networks used in
training. It is possible that training against larger numbers
of target networks at the same time could further increase
the transferability of the adversarial examples.
Finally, we look at the success rates of image transforma-
tions. Do the same images consistenly fool the networks,
or are the failure cases of the networks different? As shown
in Figure 5, for the 3 networks the ATN was trained to de-
feat, the majority of transformations attacked all three net-
works successfully. For the unseen networks, the results
were mixed; the majority of transformations successfully
attacked only a single network.
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Table 5. ATNb retrained with 3 networks (marked with *).
β Classifierp* Classifiera0 Classifiera1* Classifiera2* Classifiera3
0.010
1st Place Correct 89.9% 37.9% 83.9% 78.7% 70.2%
2nd Place Correct (Conditional) 96.1% 88.1% 96.1% 95.2% 79.1%
2nd Place Correct (Unconditional) 86.4% 34.4% 80.7% 74.9% 55.9%
0.005
1st Place Correct 93.6% 34.7% 88.1% 82.7% 64.1%
2nd Place Correct (Conditional) 96.8% 88.3% 96.9% 96.4% 73.1%
2nd Place Correct (Unconditional) 90.7% 31.4% 85.3% 79.8% 47.2%
Figure 5. Do the same transformed examples work well on all
the networks? (Top) Percentage of examples that worked on ex-
actly 0-3 training networks. (Bottom) Percentage of examples
that worked on exactly 0-2 unseen networks. Note: these are all
measured on independent test set images.
4.2. “Insider” Information
In the experiments thus far, the classifier, C, was treated
as a white box. From this box, two pieces of information
were needed to train the ATN. First, the actual outputs of C
were used to create the new target vector. Second, the error
derivatives from the new target vector were passed through
C and propagated into the ATN.
In this section, we examine the possibility of “opening” the
classifier, and accessing more of its internal state. From
C, the actual hidden unit activations for each example are
used as additional inputs to the ATN. Intuitively, because
the goal is to maintain as much similarity as possible to
the original image and to maintain the same order of the
non-top-most classifications as the original image, access
to these activations may convey usable signals.
Because of the very large number of hidden units that ac-
company convolution layers, in practice, we only use the
penultimate fully-connected layer from C. The results of
training the ATNs with this extra information are shown
in Table 6. Interestingly, the most salient difference does
not come from the ability of the ATN to attack the net-
works in the first-position. Rather, when looking at the
conditional-successes of the second-position, the numbers
are improved (compare to Table 2). We speculate that this
is because the extra hints provided by the classifier’s inter-
nal activations (with the unmodified image) could be used
to also ensure that the second-place classification, after in-
put modification, was also correctly maintained.
Table 6. Using the internal states of the classifier as inputs for the
Adversary Networks. Larger font is the percentage of times the
adversarial class was classified in the top-space. Smaller font is
how many times the original top class was correctly placed into
2nd place, conditioned on the 1st place being correct or not.
β:
0.010 0.005 0.001
ATNa
68.0%
(94.5%/64.5%)
81.4%
(96.0%/78.1%)
95.4%
(98.1%/93.6%)
ATNb
68.1%
(96.9%/66.5%)
78.9%
(98.1%/77.4%)
92.4%
(98.9%/91.4%)
ATNc
67.9%
(97.6%/66.4%)
81.0%
(98.2%/79.5%)
93.1%
(99.0%/92.1%)
4.3. Serial and Parallel ATNs
Separate ATNs are created for each digit (0-9). In this sec-
tion, we examine whether the ATNs can be used in parallel
(can the same original image be transformed by each of the
ATNs successfully?) and in serial (can the same image be
transformed by one ATN then that resulting image be trans-
formed by another, successfully?).
In the first test, we started with 1000 images of digits from
the test set. Each was passed through all 10 ATNs (ATNc,
β = 0.005); the resulting images were then classified with
Classifierp. For each image, we measured how many ATNs
were able to successfully transform the image (success is
defined for ATNt as causing the classifier to output t as the
top-class). Out of the 1000 trials, 283 were successfully
Adversarial Transformation Networks
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Figure 6. Parallel and Serial Application of 10 ATNs. Left: Examples of the same original image (shown in white background) trans-
formed correctly by all ATNs. For example, in the row of 7s, in the first column, the 7 was transformed such that the classifier output a 0
as top class, in the second column, the classifier output a 1, etc. Middle: Histogram showing the number of images that were transformed
successfully with at leastN ATNs (1-10) when used in parallel. Right: Serial Adversarial Transformation Networks. In the first column,
ATN0 is applied to the input image. In the second column, ATN1 is applied to the output of ATN0, etc. In each of these examples, all 10
of the ATNs successfully transformed the previous image to fool the classifier. Note the severe image degradation as the transformation
networks are applied in sequence.
transformed by all 10 of the ATNs. Samples results and a
histogram of the results are shown in Figure 6.
A second experiment is constructed in which the 10 ATNs
are applied serially, one-after-the-other. In this scenario,
first ATN0 is applied to image x, yielding x′. Then ATN1
is applied to x′ yielding x′′ ... to ATN9. The goal is to
see whether the transformations work on previously trans-
formed images. The results of chaining the ATNs together
in this manner are shown in Figure 6(right). The more
transformations that are applied, the larger the image degra-
dation. As expected, by the ninth transformation (rightmost
column in Figure 6) the majority of images are severely de-
graded and usually not recognizable. Though we expected
the degradation in images, there were two additional, sur-
prising, findings. First, in the parallel application of ATNs
(the first experiment described above), out of 1000 images,
283 of them were successfully transformed by 10 of the
ATNs. In this experiment, 741 images were successfully
transformed by 10 ATNs. The improvement in the number
of all-10 successes over applying the ATNs in parallel oc-
curs because each transformation effectively diminishes the
underlying original image (to remove the real classification
from the top-spot). Meanwhile, only a few new pixels are
added by the ATN to cause the misclassification as it is also
trained to minimize the reconstruction error. The overarch-
ing effect is a fading of the image through chaining ATNs
together.
Second, it is interesting to examine what happens to the
second-highest classifications that the networks were also
trained to preserve. Order preservation did not occur in this
test. Had the test worked perfectly, then for an input-image,
x (e.g., of the digit 8), after ATN0 was applied, the first
and second top classifications of x′ should be 0,8, respec-
tively. Subsequently, after ATN1 is then applied to x′, the
classifications of x′′ should be 1,0,8, etc. The reason this
does not hold in practice is that though the networks were
trained to maintain the high classification (8) of the origi-
nal digit, x, they were not trained to maintain the poten-
tially small perturbations that ATN0 made to x to achieve
a top-classification of 0. Therefore, when ATN1 is applied,
the changes that ATN0 made may not survive the trans-
formation. Nonetheless, if chaining adversaries becomes
important, then training the ATNs with images that have
been previously modified by other ATNs may be a suffi-
cient method to address the difference in training and test-
ing distributions. This is left for future work.
5. ImageNet Experiments
We explore the effectiveness of ATNs on the ImageNet
dataset (Deng et al., 2009), which consists of 1.2 million
natural images categorized into 1 of 1000 classes. The tar-
get classifier, f , used in these experiments is a pre-trained
state-of-the-art classifier, Inception ResNet v2 (IR2), that
has a top-1 single-crop error rate of 19.9% on the 50,000
image validation set, and a top-5 error rate of 4.9%. It is
described fully in Szegedy et al. (2016).
5.1. Experiment Setup
We trained AAE ATNs and P-ATNs as described in Sec-
tion 2 to attack IR2. Training an ATN against IR2 follows
the process described in Section 3.
IR2 takes as input images scaled to 299 × 299 pixels of 3
channels each. To autoencode images of this size for the
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AAE task, we use three different fully convolutional archi-
tectures (Table 7):
• IR2-Base-Deconv, a small architecture that uses the
first few layers of IR2 and loads the pre-trained param-
eter values at the start of training the ATN, followed
by deconvolutional layers;
• IR2-Resize-Conv, a small architecture that avoids
checkerboard artifacts common in deconvolutional
layers by using bilinear resize layers to downsample
and upsample between stride 1 convolutions; and
• IR2-Conv-Deconv, a medium architecture that is a
tower of convolutions followed by deconvolutions.
For the perturbation approach, we use IR2-Base-Deconv
and IR2-Conv-FC, which has many more parameters than
the other architectures due to two large fully-connected lay-
ers. The use of fully-connected layers cause the network
to learn too slowly for the autoencoding approach (AAE
ATN), but can be used to learn perturbations quickly (P-
ATN).
Hyperparameter search. All five architectures across
both tasks are trained with the same hyperparameters. For
each architecture and task, we trained four networks, one
for each target class: binoculars, soccer ball, volcano, and
zebra. In total, we trained 20 different ATNs to attack IR2.
To find a good set of hyperparameters for these networks,
we did a series of grid searches through reasonable param-
eter values for learning rate, α, and β, using only Volcano
as the target class. Those training runs were terminated af-
ter 0.025 epochs, which is only 1600 training steps with a
batch size of 20. Based on the parameter search, for the
results reported here, we set the learning rate to 0.0001,
α = 1.5, and β = 0.01. All runs were trained for 0.1
epochs (6400 steps) on shuffled training set images, using
the Adam optimizer and the TensorFlow default settings.
In order to avoid cherrypicking the best results after the
networks were trained, we selected four images from the
unperturbed validation set to use for the figures in this pa-
per prior to training. Once training finished, we evaluated
the ATNs by passing 1000 images from the validation set
through the ATN and measuring IR2’s accuracy on those
adversarial examples.
5.2. Results Overview
Table 8 shows the top-1 adversarial accuracy for each of
the 20 model/target combinations. The AAE approach is
superior to the perturbation approach, both in terms of
top-1 adversarial accuracy, and in terms of training suc-
cess. Nonetheless, the results in Figures 9 and 7 show
that using an architecture like IR2-Conv-FC can provide a
qualitatively different type of adversary from the AAE ap-
proach.The examples generated using the perturbation ap-
proach preserve more pixels in the original image, at the
expense of a small region of large perturbations.
In contrast to the perturbation approaches, the AAE
architectures distribute the differences across wider re-
gions of the image. However, IR2-Base-Deconv and
IR2-Conv-Deconv tend to exhibit checkerboard patterns,
which is a common problem in image generation with de-
convolutions (Odena et al. (2016)). The checkerboarding
led us to try IR2-Resize-Conv, which avoids the checker-
board pattern, but gives smooth outputs (Figure 9). Inter-
estingly, in all three AAE networks, many of the original
high-frequency patterns are replaced with high frequencies
that encode the adversarial signal.
The results from IR2-Base-Deconv show that the same net-
work architectures perform substantially differently when
trained as P-ATNs and AAE ATNs. Since P-ATNs are only
learning to perturb the input, these networks are much bet-
ter at preserving the original image, but the perturbations
end up being focused along the edges or in the corners of
the image. The form of the perturbations often manifests it-
self as “DeepDream”-like images, as in Figure 8. Approx-
imately the same perturbation, in the same place, is used
across all input examples. Placing the perturbations in that
manner is less likely to disrupt the other top classifications,
thereby keeping LY lower. This is in stark contrast to the
AAE ATNs, which creatively modify the input, as seen in
Figures 9 and 7.
5.3. Detailed Discussion
Adversarial diversity. Figure 7 shows that ATNs are ca-
pable of generating a wide variety of adversarial pertur-
bations targeting a single network. Previous approaches
to generating adversarial examples often produced qual-
itatively uniform results – they add various amounts of
“noise” to the image, generally concentrating the noise
at pixels with large gradient magnitude for the particular
adversarial loss function. Indeed, Hendrik Metzen et al.
(2017) recently showed that it may be possible to train a
detector for previous adversarial attacks. From the perspec-
tive of an attacker, then, adversarial examples produced by
ATNs may provide a new way past defenses in the cat-and-
mouse game of security, since this somewhat unpredictable
diversity will likely challenge such approaches to defense.
Perhaps a much more interesting consequence of this di-
versity is its potential application for more comprehensive
adversarial training, as described below.
Adversarial Training with ATNs. In Kurakin et al.
(2016b), the authors show the current state-of-the-art in
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Figure 7. Adversarial diversity. Left column: selected zoomed samples. Right 4 columns: successful adversarial examples for different
target classes from a variety of ATNs. From the left: Zebra, Binoculars, Soccer Ball, Volcano. These images were selected at random
from the set of successful adversaries against each target class. Unlike existing adversarial techniques, where adversarial examples tend
to look alike, these adversarial examples exhibit a great deal of diversity, some of which is quite surprising. For example, consider
the second image of the space shuttle in the “Zebra” column (D). In this case, the ATN made the lines on the tarmac darker and more
organic, which is somewhat evocative of a zebra’s stripes. Yet clearly no human would mistake this for an image of a zebra. Similarly,
the dog’s face in (A) has been speckled with a few orange dots (but not the background!), and these are sufficient to convince IR2 that
it is a volcano. This diversity may be a key to improving the effectiveness of adversarial training, as a more diverse pool of adversarial
examples may lead to better network generalization. Images A, B, and D are from AAE ATN IR2-Conv-Deconv. Images C and F are
from AAE ATN IR2-Resize-Conv. Image E is from P-ATN IR2-Conv-FC.
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using adveraries for improving training. With single step
and iterative gradient methods, they find that it is possi-
ble to increase a network’s robustness to adversarial exam-
ples, while suffering a small loss of accuracy on clean in-
puts. However, it works only for the adversary the network
was trained against. It appears that ATNs could be used
in their adversarial training architecture, and could provide
substantially more diversity to the trained model than cur-
rent adversaries. This adversarial diversity might improve
model test-set generalization and adversarial robustness.
Because ATNs are quick to train relative to the target net-
work (in the case of IR2, hours instead of weeks), reliably
produce diverse adversarial examples, and can be automat-
ically checked for quality (by checking their success rate
against the target network and the LX magnitude of the ad-
versarial examples), they could be used as follows: Train a
set of ATNs targeting a random subset of the output classes
on a checkpoint of the target network. Once the ATNs are
trained, replace a fraction of each training batch with corre-
sponding adversarial examples, subject to two constraints:
the current classifier incorrectly classifies the adversarial
example as the target class, and the LX loss of the ad-
versarial example is below a threshold that indicates it is
similar to the original image. If a given ATN stops produc-
ing successful adversarial examples, replace it with a newly
trained ATN targeting another randomly selected class. In
this manner, throughout training, the target network would
be exposed to a shifting set of diverse adversaries from
ATNs that can be trained in a fully-automated manner.5,6
DeepDream perturbations. IR2-Conv-FC exhibits in-
teresting behavior not seen in any of the other architectures.
The network builds a perturbation that generally contains
spatially coherent, recognizable regions of the target class.
For example, in Figure 8, a consistent soccer-ball “ghost”
image appears in all of the transformed images. While the
methods and goals of these perturbations are quite different
from those generated by DeepDream (Mordvintsev et al.,
2015), the qualitative results appear similar. IR2-Conv-FC
seems to learn to distill the target network’s representation
of the target class in a manner that can be drawn across a
large fraction of the image.7 This result hints at a direct
5This procedure conceptually resembles GAN train-
ing (Goodfellow et al., 2014a) in many ways, but the goal is
different: for GANs, the focus is on using an easy-to-train dis-
criminator to learn a hard-to-train generator; for this adversarial
training system, the focus is on using easy-to-train generators to
learn a hard-to-train multi-class classifier.
6Note also that we can run the adversarial example generation
in this algorithm on unlabeled data, as described in Section 2.
Miyato et al. (2016) also describe a method for using unlabeled
data in a manner conceptually similar to adversarial training.
7This is likely due to the final fully-connected layer, which
has one weight for each pixel and channel, allowing the network
to specify a particular output at each pixel.
Figure 8. DeepDream-style perturbations. Four different im-
ages perturbed by IR2-Conv-FC, targeting soccer ball. The im-
ages outlined in red were successful adversarial examples against
IR2. The images outlined in green did not change IR2’s top-1
classification. The network has learned to add approximately the
same perturbation to all images. The perturbation resembles part
of a soccer ball (lower-left corner). The results are akin to those
found in DeepDream-like processes (Mordvintsev et al., 2015).
relationship between DeepDream-style techniques and ad-
versarial examples that may improve our ability to find and
correct weaknesses in our models.
High frequency data. The AAE ATNs all remove high
frequency data from the images when building their recon-
structions. This is likely to be due to limitations of the un-
derlying architectures. In particular, all three convolutional
architectures have difficulty exactly recreating edges from
the input image, due to spatial data loss introduced when
downsampling and padding. Consequently, the LX loss pe-
nalizes high confidence predictions of edge locations, lead-
ing the networks to learn to smooth out boundaries in the
reconstruction. This strategy minimizes the overall loss,
but it also places a lower bound on the error imposed by
pixels in regions with high frequency information.
This lower bound on the loss in some regions provides the
network with an interesting strategy when generating an
AAE output: it can focus the adversarial perturbations in
regions of the input image that have high-frequency noise.
This strategy is visible in many of the more interesting
images in Figure 7. For example, many of the networks
make minimal modification to the sky in the dog image,
but add substantial changes around the edges of the dog’s
face, exactly where the LX error would be high in a non-
adversarial reconstruction.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Current methods for generating adversarial samples in-
volve a gradient descent procedure on individual input ex-
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Figure 9. Architecture comparisons. Left 3: Adversarial autoencoding ATNs. Right 2: Perturbation ATNs. All five networks in this
figure are trained with the same hyperparameters, apart from the target class, which varies among zebra, soccer ball, and volcano. The
images in the bottom row show the absolute difference between the original image (not shown) and the adversarial examples. There
are substantial differences in how the different architectures generate adversarial examples. IR2-Base-Deconv and IR2-Conv-Deconv
tend to exhibit checkerboard patterns in their reconstructions, which is a common problem in image generation with deconvolutions
in general. IR2-Resize-Conv avoids the checkerboard pattern, but tends to give very smooth outputs. IR2-Base-Deconv performs quite
differently when trained as a P-ATN rather than an AAE ATN. The P-ATNs focus their perturbations along the edges of the image or in
the corners, where they are presumably less likely to disrupt the other top classifications. In both P-ATNs, it turns out that the networks
learn to mostly ignore the input and simply generate a single perturbation that can be applied to any input image without much change,
although the perturbations between networks on the same target image vary substantially. This is in stark contrast to the AAE ATNs,
which creatively modify each input individually, as seen here and in Figure 7.
Table 7. ImageNet ATN Architectures.
IR2-Base-Deconv
(3.4M parameters)
IR2 MaxPool 5a (35x35x192)→ Pad (37x37x192)→ Deconv (4x4x512, stride=2)
→ Deconv (3x3x256, stride=2)→ Deconv (4x4x128, stride=2)
→ Pad (299x299x128)→ Deconv (4x4x3)→ Image (299x299x3)
IR2-Resize-Conv
(3.8M parameters)
Conv (5x5x128)→ Bilinear Resize (0.5)→ Conv (4x4x256)→
Bilinear Resize (0.5)→ Conv (3x3x512)→ Bilinear Resize (0.5)→ Conv (1x1x512)
→ Bilinear Resize (2)→ Conv (3x3x256)→ Bilinear Resize (2)→ Conv (4x4x128)
→ Pad (299x299x128)→ Conv (3x3x3)→ Image (299x299x3)
IR2-Conv-Deconv
(12.8M parameters)
Conv (3x3x256, stride=2)→ Conv (3x3x512, stride=2)→ Conv (3x3x768, stride=2)
→ Deconv (4x4x512, stride=2)→ Deconv (3x3x256, stride=2)
→ Deconv (4x4x128, stride=2)→ Pad (299x299x128)
→ Deconv (4x4x3)→ Image (299x299x3)
IR2-Conv-FC
(233.7M parameters)
Conv (3x3x512, stride=2)→ Conv (3x3x256, stride=2)→ Conv (3x3x128, stride=2)
→ FC (512)→ FC (268203)→ Image (299x299x3)
Table 8. IL2 ATN Performance
P-ATN TARGET CLASS TOP-1 ACCURACY
BINOCULARS SOCCER BALL VOLCANO ZEBRA
IR2-Base-Deconv 66.0% 56.5% 0.2% 43.2%
IR2-Conv-FC 79.9% 78.8% 0.0% 85.6%
AAE ATN TARGET CLASS TOP-1 ACCURACY
BINOCULARS SOCCER BALL VOLCANO ZEBRA
IR2-Base-Deconv 83.0% 92.1% 88.1% 88.2%
IR2-Resize-Conv 69.8% 61.4% 91.1% 80.2%
IR2-Conv-Deconv 56.6% 75.0% 87.3% 79.1%
amples. We have presented a fundamentally different ap-
proach to finding examples by training neural networks to
convert inputs into adversarial examples. Our method is
efficient to train, fast to execute, and produces remarkably
diverse, successful adversarial examples.
Future work should explore the possibility of using ATNs
in adversarial training. A successful ATN-based system
may pave the way towards models with better generaliza-
tion and robustness.
Hendrik Metzen et al. (2017) recently showed that it is
possible to detect when an input is adversarial, for current
types of adversaries. It may be possible to train such de-
tectors on ATN output. If so, using that signal as an ad-
ditional loss for the ATN may improve the outputs. Sim-
ilarly, exploring the use of a GAN discriminator during
training may improve the realism of the ATN outputs. It
would be interesting to explore the impact of ATNs on gen-
erative models, rather than just classifiers, similar to work
in Kos et al. (2017). Finally, it may also be possible to
train ATNs in a black-box manner, similar to recent work
in Trame`r et al. (2016); Baluja et al. (2015), or using RE-
INFORCE (Williams, 1992) to compute gradients for the
ATN using the target network simply as a reward signal.
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